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Non-Technical Summary 
A reading of the recent financial press suggests that a major depreciation of the 
dollar is needed to correct the current account and trade deficits of the United States 
which are believed to be unsustainable. For this purpose, East Asia countries stop 
pegging their currency to the dollar. Especially China should allow a large 
appreciation of the renminbi and afterwards move to unrestricted floating. 
This argumentation rests on two crucial assumptions. The first assumption is that an 
appreciation of the Asian currencies against the dollar would significantly reduce the 
trade surplus of the countries with the United States. The second is that a more 
flexible exchange rate is needed to fairly balance international competitiveness. 
In the paper, I show that these assumptions do not hold under a regime of the 
international dollar standard. In this case, a discrete appreciation by a dollar creditor 
country of the United States would have no predictable effect on its trade surplus. 
The assumption of a reduced trade surplus only takes into account the relative price 
effects but does neglect the income (absorption) effect which is not small and 
controllable under a dollar standard. Moreover, a differential adjustment in the rate 
of growth of money wages will more accurately reflect international differences in 
productivity growth, when a peripheral country’s dollar exchange rate is fixed.  
For China, the paper proposes a move towards a very narrow band for the 
yuan/dollar exchange rate. This would decentralize foreign exchange transacting but 
not significantly affect China’s competitiveness in international markets for goods or 
services. A high growth in domestic money wages that reflects a very high growth in 
labor productivity would remain the dominant mechanism for balancing 
international competitiveness.  
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Abstract 
Under the world dollar standard, a discrete appreciation by a dollar creditor country 
of the United States, such as China or Japan, has no predictable effect on its trade 
surplus. Currency appreciation by the creditor country will slow its economic 
growth and eventually cause deflation but cannot compensate for a saving-
investment imbalance in the United States. Under a fixed exchange rate, however, 
differential adjustment in the rate of growth of money wages will more accurately 
reflect international differences in productivity growth. International 
competitiveness will be better balanced between high-growth and low-growth 
economies, as between Japan and the U.S. from in 1950 to 1971 and China and the 
U.S. from 1994 to 2005, when the peripheral country’s dollar exchange rate is fixed 
so that its wage growth better reflects its higher productivity growth.  The qualified 
case for China moving toward greater flexibility in the form of a very narrow band 
for the yuan/dollar exchange rate, as a way of decentralizing foreign exchange 
transacting, is discussed.  
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1 Introduction 
Seldom have the pages of the financial press in Europe and America been so full of 
grave editorializing on the need for a major depreciation of the dollar to correct the 
“unsustainable” current account and trade deficits of the United States. Much of this 
international moralizing directs the high-growth East Asian countries to stop 
pegging their currencies to the dollar—or, in China’s case, to allow a large 
appreciation of the renminbi before moving to unrestricted floating. The critics’ 
message has two facets.  
First, in order to reduce East Asia’s large trade surpluses and thereby reduce 
America’s even larger trade deficit, U.S. and European critics suggest that Asian 
governments should let their currencies appreciate discretely against the dollar. For 
example, Fred Bergsten, Morris Goldstein, Nicholas Lardy, and Michael Mussa 
from the Institute for International Economics (IIE) in Washington D.C., all suggest 
that an immediate 20 to 25 percent appreciation of the renminbi is warranted 
(Bergsten et al. 2005). However, they provide no suitable conceptual model—let 
alone econometric evidence—that this would significantly reduce China’s trade 
surplus with the United States.  
 Second, because of the very high ongoing productivity growth in some East Asian 
countries (notably China) relative to that in the United States and Europe, critics 
contend that subsequent continual appreciation of the renminbi (couched in terms of 
making its exchange rate more flexible) may also be required to fairly balance 
international competitiveness. And many outside critics see “smooth” ongoing 
upward adjustments in the renminbi to be best obtained by China’s government 
eventually allowing its currency to float freely—instead of intervening heavily to 
hold it down as is now the case.  
In this paper, I contend that these critics are wrong in both respects.  Their 
“conventional wisdom” is based on faulty, although unfortunately widely accepted, 
theorizing that fails to come to grips with how the international dollar standard 
works.  
I will first discuss why a discrete appreciation by a dollar creditor country of the 
United States such as China or Japan would have no predictable effect on its trade 
surplus. I will then show how differential adjustment in the rate of growth of money 
wages will more accurately reflect international differences in productivity growth, 
i.e., international competitiveness will be better balanced through time, when a 
peripheral country’s dollar exchange rate is fixed. Finally, I will discuss the optimal 
degree of flexibility in the foreign exchanges for China at the present time. 
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2 The Exchange Rate and the Trade Balance 
Why is the common presumption that an exchange rate change by itself would have 
a predictable effect on a country’s trade balance often incorrect? This presumption 
has been canonized in a model called the elasticities approach to the balance of trade 
that focuses on relative price effects. It is intuitively plausible because an 
appreciating country’s exports obviously become more expensive in world markets 
and fall, whereas imports become cheaper and “should” increase. The problem is 
that proponents of the elasticities approach focus on these relative price effects of an 
exchange rate change and either ignore the income (absorption) effects or believe 
them to be small and controllable. 
But under the world dollar standard where foreign trade and asset flows are largely 
invoiced in dollars, a peripheral country will be exposed to major income and wealth 
effects should its dollar exchange rate change.  In particular, an appreciation against 
the dollar would have (is having) unacceptable worldwide macroeconomic 
consequences without correcting the U.S. trade and current account deficits.   
Among financially open economies, sustained exchange rate changes must reflect 
relative monetary policies expected in the future: relatively tight money and 
deflation in the appreciating countries and relatively easy money with inflation in 
the country whose currency depreciates. After a sharp appreciation, multinational as 
well as national firms will see the country as a less good (more expensive) place in 
which to invest so that investment slumps. In creditor countries that have built up 
large dollar claims on foreigners, this deflationary impact of an exchange 
appreciation is further accentuated because these dollar assets lose value in terms of 
the domestic currency: a negative wealth effect that reduces consumption as well as 
investment. In summary, depressed domestic spending offsets the relative price 
effect of an appreciation so as to leave the effect on the net trade balance 
indeterminant.2   
The high-saving countries in Asia and Europe (and including Canada), all creditors 
of the low-saving United States, face the specter of a growth slowdown or outright 
deflation should their currencies appreciate. For example, the repeated appreciations 
of the yen from 1985 to 1995 created the bubble in Japanese land and equity values 
from 1987 to 1990 and then, with the inevitable collapse of the bubble, threw Japan 
into a deflationary slump in the 1990s with a zero interest liquidity trap that made 
                                           
2  In dollar debtor countries facing the threat of having their currencies depreciate against the 
dollar, the negative wealth effect tends to reinforce the relative price effect of an actual 
devaluation.  Their trade balances could improve sharply from devaluation as domestic 
consumption (and imports) slumps even as their now cheaper exports expand into world 
markets.  This was the case for Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, Philippines, and Thailand after the 
great Asian crisis of 1997-98.  Their current accounts went from being sharply negative before 
the crisis to positive immediately afterwards.    
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monetary policy helpless to revive the Japanese economy. In 2003 and 2004, the 
Japanese economy staged a partial recovery on the back of the China boom. But the 
current rise of the yen toward 100 to the dollar could well throw Japan, still in a 
liquidity trap, into a renewed deflationary slump in 2005. Similarly, with the 50 
percent appreciation of the euro against the dollar in 2002-2004, continental Europe 
is facing slower economic growth—although not yet as protracted as the earlier 
Japanese experience.  
These exchange-rate induced growth slowdowns or slumps in the appreciating 
economies sharply reduce their demand for imports. At the same time, their exports 
become more expensive in world markets. Because the fall in exports is coupled 
with a fall in imports, the net effect on their trade balances is unpredictable 
(McKinnon and Ohno 1997, chs 6 and 7). The ever-higher yen from 1971 to 1995 
led to even bigger Japanese trade surpluses. All that is predictable is that the 
appreciating country will suffer deflationary pressure. However, if outside 
commentators and government officials persist in the mistaken belief that 
appreciation will reduce the trade surpluses of America’s creditor countries, their 
“talk” encourages hot money flows out of dollars into the currencies of creditor 
countries in Asia and Europe—a particularly acute problem for China currently. 
These countries then find it more difficult to avoid actual appreciation and unwanted 
deflation.   
Conversely, if deflationary pressure in creditor countries is muted because of 
orchestrated joint appreciations of their currencies against the dollar, this would 
induce an outburst of unacceptably high inflation in the United States. For example, 
President Nixon’s well-telegraphed depreciation of the dollar in August 1971 
touched off a flight from dollar assets and also the high and volatile U.S. inflation of 
the 1970s.   
If exchange rate changes are not the answer to American trade deficits and Asian 
trade surpluses, what are the more fundamental causes? The major ongoing and 
long-run distortion in the world’s financial system is America’s saving deficiency, 
large fiscal deficits by the Federal Government and meager household saving, 
coupled with a virtually unlimited dollar line of credit on to borrow from the rest of 
the world.3 In addition, over the last two years, U.S. monetary policy has also been 
too loose with short-term interest rates well below the rate of inflation leading to 
excess consumption—in part by inducing a bubble in housing prices.  
                                           
3  In a provocative paper, Ben Bernanke (2005) argues that the problem is more one of excess 
saving in other countries, particularly in Asia, than a saving deficiency in the United States. 
Either way, however, this international saving imbalance cannot be corrected by exchange rate 
changes.  
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The result is heavy U.S. borrowing in international markets that is then transferred 
in terms of real resources by foreign countries running trade surpluses with the 
United States. The U.S. current-account deficit forces Canada and countries in Asia, 
Europe, and now even in Latin America, into current account surpluses.   
3 The Exchange Rate and International Competitiveness 
At least some of the critics of Asian countries’ pegging to the dollar would agree 
that low saving in the United States, rather than misaligned exchange rates, is the 
root cause of the trade imbalance. However, suppose a country with very high 
productivity growth such as China trades with countries with much lower 
productivity growth.  In the new millennium, Japan and Europe have overall trade 
surpluses, and the United States has an overall trade deficit.  But all of these more 
mature industrial countries have much lower productivity growth than China’s.  Isn’t 
exchange rate flexibility with ongoing appreciation of the renminbi more or less 
necessary to balance international competitiveness by offsetting the productivity 
differential between China and its slower growing trading partners?  Indeed, because 
of foreign unease, China has promised that the yuan/dollar exchange rate will 
become more flexible in the future.   
As long as the American price level remains stable, more flexibility in the central 
exchange rate of 8.28 yuan per dollar is neither necessary nor desirable for balancing 
international competitiveness with China’s neighbors in the long run.  International 
adjustment occurs by money wages naturally growing faster in the country with 
higher productivity growth. But this mechanism of differential wage adjustment, 
with more rapid wage growth in China than the United States, only works well when 
enterprises and workers in China are confident that the central rate will remain fixed 
indefinitely, and China’s inflation remains more or less aligned with that in the 
United States. Then Chinese employers in the rapidly growing tradables sectors, 
largely manufacturing, will vigorously bid for workers subject to the constraint of 
having to remain internationally competitive at the fixed nominal exchange rate. 
Money wages, particularly for the increasingly skilled workers, then rise in line with 
the high-productivity growth. Similar wage growth than spreads out through the rest 
of the economy, including nontradable services.  
In the 1950s and 1960s under the Bretton Woods system of fixed dollar exchange 
rates, how differential wage growth became the principal mode of international 
adjustment was first articulated for high-growth Scandinavia when the Swedish, 
Norwegian, and Danish currencies were all pegged to the dollar. But very high 
productivity growth in postwar Japan relative to the United States, when the 
yen/dollar rate was also convincingly fixed, provides an equally striking example of 
what is now known as the “Scandinavian Model” of wage adjustment (Lindbeck, 
1979). 
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Japan’s Dollar Exchange Rate in Historical Perspective 
When the yen was fixed at 360 to the dollar from 1950 to 1971, the importance of 
relative wage adjustment between Japan and the United States was pronounced. 
Table 1 gives the summary statistics for this remarkable era of very high Japanese 
growth in comparison to those of the wealthier, and consequently more slowly 
growing, United States. From 1950 to 1971, Japan’s annual growth in real output 
was 9.45 percent while industrial production grew an even more astonishing 14.56 
percent per year. Unsurprisingly, the annual growth in Japanese labor productivity of 
8.92 percent was far in excess of the 2.55 percent in the United States.  However, the 
balancing item was that  average money wages grew at a robust rate of 10 percent 
per year in Japan and only 4.5 percent in the U.S.  Figure 1 shows the dramatic rise 
of Japanese money wages relative to American wages under the Bretton Woods 
system of fixed dollar exchange rates.   
Table 1: Key economic indicators for Japan and the United States, 1950-1971 
 (average annual percent change) 
Wholesale prices Money wages Consumer prices Industrial 
production 
U.S. Japan U.S. Japan U.S. Japan U.S. Japan 
1.63 0.69a 4.52 10.00 2.53 5.01 4.40 14.56 
 
Real GDP 
 
Nominal GDP 
 
Narrow money 
 
Labor productivity 
U.S. Japan U.S. Japan U.S. Japan U.S. Japan 
3.84 9.45a 6.79 14.52a 3.94 16.10b 2.55 8.92c
Source: IMF, International Financial Statistics, CD-ROM, October 2003, unless otherwise noted.  
Japanese real income data, wholesale price data, and labor productivity data are from Japan 
Economic Yearbook, 1960-1971, Economic Survey of Japan, 1954-1959, and OECD Economic 
Surveys: Japan, 1964-1971.  Labor productivity data for the U.S. are obtained from the index for 
the nonfarm business sector as reported by the Bureau of Labor Statistics.  Note that labor 
productivity refers to the industrial sector. 
a1952-1971. 
b1953-1971. 
c1951-1971. 
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Figure 1: Nominal Manufacturing Wage Growth for US and Japan: 
                1950-1971    
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Source: IFS: IMF 
Keeping the yen at 360 per dollar effectively anchored Japan’s price level for 
tradable goods. In the 1950s and 1960s, the Japanese wholesale price index (WPI) 
rose less than 1 percent per year whereas the American WPI rose a bit more than 1 
percent (Table 1). Because the bulk of world trade was invoiced in dollars, fixing an 
exchange rate to the dollar was (is) a stronger anchor for the price level than the size 
of Japanese bilateral trade with the United States would suggest.  
Employers in Japan’s manufacturing export sector, with its extremely high growth in 
labor productivity, then bid vigorously for both skilled and unskilled workers subject 
to remaining internationally competitive at the fixed exchange rate.  Wages rose 
rapidly in manufacturing so that workers received the main fruits from the 
productivity growth there. But then, as in the Scandinavian Model, these high wage 
settlements spread into the rest of the economy, such as nontradable services, where 
productivity growth was much lower. The result was that, within Japan, the price of 
services rose relative to goods prices.  For 1950-71, Table 1 shows that Japan’s CPI, 
which includes services as well as goods, began to increase much faster at 5 percent 
per year than its WPI, which contains only goods. But Japan’s international 
competitiveness in its high-growth tradables sector remained balanced with the 
United States.  
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In Japan’s bygone high-growth era, fashioning a purely domestic monetary anchor 
would have been more difficult. As in China today, restrictions on domestic interest 
rates proliferated; and the rate of growth in narrow money was high and 
unpredictable—more than 16 percent per year from 1950 to 1971 as Japanese 
households rebuilt their financial assets after the war. Thus having the Bank of Japan 
simply key on the dollar exchange rate was the most convenient instrument for 
stabilizing Japan’s tradable goods price level while promoting high growth in money 
r against other major currencies while 
continuing to inflate.  He   chose to devalue in August 1971, and the United States 
80 
to the dollar in April 1995, and threw Japan into its deflationary slump of the 1990s 
ng 
to reduce its trade surplus, the erratically appreciating yen undermined the natural 
process of relative wage adjustment for balancing international competitiveness.  
                                          
wages.  
By the end of the 1960s, however, American monetary policy became too 
inflationary. The loss of America’s foreign competitiveness was too great for the 
Bretton Woods system of fixed dollar exchange parities to survive. President Nixon 
had to choose between disinflating at home and thus maintaining the fixed rate 
system, or forcing a devaluation of the dolla
suffered the great inflation of the 1970s.        
The“Floating” Yen: Appreciation and Deflation. For two decades after August 
1971, productivity growth in Japan remained high relative to that in the United 
States.  Japanese exports made major inroads into American markets for steel, autos, 
machine tools, semi-conductors, and so on. In the midst of numerous trade disputes, 
the U.S. government reacted by continually trying to “talk” or force the yen up on 
the presumption that an appreciating yen would improve America’s external 
competitiveness4.  Indeed, the yen did rise all the way from 360 in 1971 to touch 
with a zero interest liquidity trap that lasts to the present day (McKinnon 2005).   
The deflation also reduced growth in Japanese money wages. It essentially destroyed 
the natural wage-adjustment mechanism for balancing international competitiveness 
that had held when the exchange rate was fixed. Once the yen began to appreciate, 
Figure 2 shows the breakdown in relative wage adjustment—albeit with a lag. 
Before 1975, money wage growth in Japan remained much higher than in the United 
States. Subsequently, as relative deflation in Japan set in (particularly from the sharp 
rise in the yen in 1977-78), Japan’s money wage growth slowed sharply.  From the 
1980s into the new millennium, it became even lower than that in the United States. 
So, besides damaging the Japanese economy in a macroeconomic sense while faili
 
4   As discussed in detail in Chapter 4 of McKinnon and Ohno (1997).  
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Figure 2: Inflation and Wage Differential between Japan and US, and Yen/Dollar 
       Rate, 1950 to 2004  
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Source: IMF: IFS.  Positive values indicate higher inflation and higher wage increases in Japan. 
Although the yen has not appreciated on net balance since 1995, it has fluctuated 
widely against the dollar. Without the assurance of a fixed exchange rate anchor, re-
establishing growth in Japanese money wages to accurately reflect (potential) 
productivity growth remains problematic.  In 2004, annual money wage growth in 
Japan was close to zero whereas in the U.S. it was 2.4 percent.  
Wage Adjustment in China under a Fixed Exchange Rate 
 Unlike Japan, China has kept its exchange rate stable since 1994—and did not have 
the earlier misfortune of being pushed into a deflationary slump from an 
appreciating currency. Table 2 provides the key summary statistics comparing China 
to the United States.  From 1994 through 2003, money wages in manufacturing 
increased by about 13 percent in China and by just 3 percent in the United States.  
This 10 percentage-point wage-growth differential approximately reflected the 
differential growth of labor productivity: about 12.3 percent in China5 versus 2.7 
percent in the United States since 1994.  Under the fixed yuan/dollar exchange rate, 
                                           
5   This estimate of productivity growth is not official, and was taken from Zhang and Tan (2004). 
In both countries, how best to measure labor productivity growth is controversial. Estimates for 
China can vary. 
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the appropriate wage-adjustment mechanism for balancing international 
competitiveness seems to be alive and well.  
Table 2: Key economic indicators for China and the United States, 1994-2003 
 (average annual percent change) 
Wholesale prices Money wages 
(Mfg) 
Consumer prices Industrial 
production 
U.S. China U.S. China U.S. China U.S. China 
1.53 1.26a 3.03 13.04b 2.43 2.84 3.00 12.17c
 
Real GDP 
 
Nominal GDP 
 
Narrow money 
 
Labor productivity 
U.S. China U.S. China U.S. China U.S. China 
3.17 8.55 5.03 10.74 4.16 17.88 2.70 12.32d 
9.48e
Source: IMF, International Financial Statistics. CD-ROM, Nov 2004, unless otherwise noted.  
Chinese CPI, manufacturing wage data, labor productivity data, real income data, and wholesale 
price data are from China Statistical Yearbook, 2004.  Labor productivity data for the U.S. are 
obtained from the index for the nonfarm business sector as reported by the Bureau of Labor 
Statistics.  The China labor productivity data refers only to the industrial sector. 
a Ex-factory price index. 
b 2003 data on manufacturing wages is projected from overall average wages from 1997-2003. 
c 1994-2002. 
d 1994-2001. Zhang and Tan  
e 1994-2002. R. Fernholz 
 
Figure 3 shows China’s dramatically higher growth in money wages in 
manufacturing relative to the United States over the past decade.  Within China, 
Figure 4 show that wages in all sectors were rising fast—with wage growth in 
manufacturing about the median for the economy as a whole.  Much of this reflects 
the upgrading of skills and greater work experience of the labor force. True, at the 
margin, the wages of unskilled migrant workers may be lagging—and many of these 
seem to be absorbed into construction activities where average wages show the 
slowest rate of growth in Figure 4. 
 9
Figure 3: Nominal Manufacturing Wage Growth for US and China, 1994-2003  
 (Base Year 1994 = 100) 
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Source: IFS: IMF; Chinese manufacturing wage data are obtained from China Statistical 
Yearbook, 2004 
Figure 4: China: nominal Wages Across Different Sectors, 1994-2002 
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Source: China Statistical Yearbook, 2003 
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China’s exchange rate stabilization in 1994 followed a major depreciation of the 
renminbi associated with the unification of the official exchange rate at the much 
higher “free-market” swap rate.  Figure 5 shows that the official rate jumped from 
5.5 to 8.7 yuan per dollar. Because much of China’s trade—particularly in 
manufacturers—had been transacted at the higher swap rate, this jump in the official 
rate overstates the effective devaluation. Nevertheless, because of a temporary burst 
of domestic inflation from 1993 to 1996 as shown in figures 5 and 6, the “real” 
devaluation was negligible.  But the nominal devaluation certainly exacerbated the 
inflation. By 1996, the renminbi had appreciated slightly to 8.28 to the dollar where 
it has remained ever since.  Chinese price inflation then settled down after 1996 and 
seems have converged close to the American level. In 2004, the China’s CPI rose 
3.8 percent while that in the United States rose 3.3 percent. The fixed rate regime 
now serves China as a nominal anchor for its price level much like the fixed 
yen/dollar rate served Japan in the 1950s and 1960s. 
One might argue that, in 2004, inflation was too high in both China and the United 
States.  But under the international dollar standard, only the center country can 
exercise monetary policy independently. Thus the onus is on the United States to 
disinflate. Fortunately, in 2005, the Federal Reserve seems to be committed to 
steadily increasing short-term interest rates back to more normal levels after its 
unprecedented monetary easing (low federal funds rates) in 2003 and 2004. Thus, in 
2005, inflation should calm down in both countries. China should have less trouble 
with inflows of “hot” money, and even less trouble if outside commentators and 
government officials stop talking about the “need” to appreciate the RMB.    
More generally for the increasingly integrated East Asian economies, China’s fix at 
8.28 yuan per dollar has become the key to intra East Asian exchange stability in the 
new millennium. All the others more or less peg to the dollar and thus to each other. 
If this fixed rate system continues, adjustment in relative wage growth in the other 
East Asian economies becomes the main vehicle for balancing international 
competitiveness.   
In the context of the old Scandinavian model of wage adjustment, the tableau below 
compares the 1950-71 Japanese and 1994-2005 Chinese experiences under fixed 
dollar exchange rates (the first row) with the post 1971 Japanese experience with a 
floating and erratically appreciating yen (the second row).  
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Tableau on Wage Bargaining 
  Relative PPP Wage Bargaining Process Money Wage Growth 
Fixed Dollar 
Exchange Rate 
Yes Determinant Reflects productivity 
growth in tradables 
Floating 
Exchange Rate 
No Indeterminant ? 
 
Under a fixed dollar exchange rate, the system converges to relative purchasing 
power parity (PPP): the rate of inflation in tradables in the peripheral country 
converges to that in the center country. Subject to the fixed exchange rate constraint, 
wage bargaining is determinant in the sense that employers bid up money wages to 
fully reflect the growth of labor productivity in the rapidly growing export sector. 
International competitiveness is balanced.  
Under a floating rate that moves randomly or is hectored into appreciating as with 
the Japanese yen from 1971 to 1995, bargaining over money wage growth becomes 
indeterminant. Because risk-averse employers can no longer judge the future course 
of the (erratically appreciating) exchange rate, they hesitate to bid money wages up 
by the full amount of productivity growth in the tradables sector. This could be 
characterized as a negative risk premium in wage bargaining that parallels the 
negative risk premium in domestic interest rates arising out of fear of appreciation, 
which has driven short-term interest rates in Japan to zero (McKinnon 2005, Chapter 
4).  When full scale deflation sets in, money wage growth can also approach zero 
but, unlike interest rates, could even become negative6.    
External pressure aside, the weakest link in the current East Asian monetary cum 
exchange rate system still seems to be Japan. The yen/dollar rate has not been 
credibly fixed within a narrow range despite massive interventions by the Bank of 
Japan to prevent the yen from appreciating. The fear of future yen appreciation and 
further deflation is still rife—and money wages are not adjusting properly.  So the 
first order of business is for the Bank of Japan is to come up with a more credible 
dollar fix for the yen that would better stabilize intra East Asian exchange rates 
while ameliorating deflationary fears in Japan itself (McKinnon 2005, McKinnon 
and Ohno 1997).  
However, China now faces more external pressure to appreciate, and the threat of 
trade sanctions if it does not—much like the  “Japan bashing” of the 1970s to the 
                                           
6  I am greatly indebted to Ms Hong Qiao for pointing out this interesting parallel between a 
negative foreign exchange risk premium in domestic interest rates and in bargaining over 
growth  in domestic money wages.  
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mid 1990s. The potential threat from being pushed into continual currency 
appreciation, as did Japan after 1971, is a consequent slowdown in China’s 
economic growth and eventually outright deflation. 
4 Limited Foreign Exchange Flexibility for China 
Partly responding to foreign pressure but also because China could benefit from a 
more open foreign exchange market with decentralized transacting, it is important to 
pin down what the Chinese government should mean by greater foreign exchange 
“flexibility”. This involves both the pace of liberalizing and rationalizing of capital 
controls (relaxing administrative constraints on foreign exchange transacting) and 
the optimal degree of flexibility in the exchange rate itself. Let us discuss each in 
turn.   
In one respect China has been, and remains, very open to foreign capital flows.  
Inward foreign direct investment (FDI) at over US$40 billion per year since 2000 
has been higher than China’s multilateral trade surplus of about 3 percent of GDP. 
FDI has been an important vehicle for introducing the modern technology 
underlying China’s rapid industrial transformation. It has also been a major 
contributor to the buildup of China’s liquid dollar assets, both held privately and 
increasingly as official exchange reserves—about US$660 billion as of March 2005.  
And outward FDI may be beginning in a significant way, as with Lenovo’s purchase 
of IBM’s PC division in 2005, and with large numbers of less publicized 
investments in African infrastucture projects. 
 However, there are two distortions in official Chinese policy that unduly amplify 
the financial magnitudes of inward FDI. First, the tax treatment of foreigners 
investing in China, particularly in special economic zones, is still more favorable 
than that accorded domestic investment—although much equalization has occurred. 
While entirely rational at the beginning of China’s opening to international trade in 
the 1980s, such favoritism for foreign FDI is now counterproductive for encouraging 
domestic entrepreneurship. The second distortion is to limit foreign firms borrowing 
from domestic Chinese banks to help fund their operations in China.  China wants 
and needs foreign technical expertise, but with its domestic high domestic saving, it 
does not need foreign finance. Thus allowing foreign firms to borrow domestically 
would reduce unwanted financial inflows. 
In foreign trade more generally, China has followed, and is following, the optimal 
order of (gradual) economic liberalization (McKinnon 1993). In the mid 1990s, 
China consolidated its exchange rate system and achieved full current account 
convertibility for the renminbi in the sense of satisfying the IMF’s Article VIII. In 
the new millennium, China is rapidly satisfying its WTO obligations by eliminating 
quota restrictions and drastically cutting tariffs. On capital account, it has liberalized 
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relatively illiquid FDI flows before eliminating restrictions on shorter term and more 
liquid financial flows. All this is according to what is now received textbook theory. 
But this last stage, that of liberalizing liquid international financial flows, which can 
all too easily become “hot” money, is best done very carefully in conjunction with 
an appropriate regulatory framework— or not at all. The most important principle is 
to contain (latent) moral hazard in financial institutions, implicitly or explicitly 
insured by the Chinese government, by limiting their ability to assume risk. In 
particular, undue foreign exchange exposure in banks and other financial institutions 
can imperil both themselves and the economy.  And foreign financial institutions 
should always be subject to the same stringent regulatory constraints as domestic 
ones. 
What is the best way to proceed with this delicate last stage in the liberalization 
process? One way is to assign foreign exchange trading exclusively to authorized 
banks that must keep their exposure in any foreign currency against renminbi within 
well defined limits. The State Administration for Foreign Exchange (SAFE) would 
then continuously monitor the net foreign exchange positions of these authorized 
banks relative to their capital positions.  Only after this interbank foreign exchange 
market between renminbi and dollars is well established would further liberalization 
be considered. For example, free foreign exchange trading between major foreign 
currencies, such as yen against euros, would remain prohibited until a later stage.  
Assuming that these prudential regulatory restraints are in place, what should be the 
range of variation of the yuan/dollar rate itself? In the 1960s during the old Bretton 
Woods system of fixed dollar parities for Western European countries and Japan, 
market rates varied within a two percent band around their central rates. Indeed, the 
foreign exchange margins (one percent on either side of the official parity rate) were 
officially announced and corresponded to Article IV of the original IMF articles of 
Agreement. On most trading days, their central banks did not have to intervene and 
all the clearing of international payments devolved to the authorized commercial 
banks. But the system was punctuated by occasional crises when official 
intervention became necessary. 
In China today, allowing a similar two-percent band around the central rate of 8.28 
yuan per dollar, within which the market rate could fluctuate freely daily or weekly, 
would efficiently decentralize the foreign exchange market.  Indeed, as capital 
controls are replaced by careful prudential regulation over the net foreign exchange 
exposures of authorized commercial banks, a widening of the band to, say, 1 percent 
on either side of the “parity” rate of 8.28 yuan per dollar would make the foreign 
exchange market more flexible. The current margins are only about 0.3 percent on 
either side of 8.28, and unduly limit the private profitability of foreign exchange 
transacting.  
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If the two-percent band is fully credible, in non-crisis periods, the Peoples Bank of 
China need seldom intervene to maintain it. Thus having the PBC officially 
announce what the band limits are reinforces regressive expectations: any deviation 
of the market rate away from 8.28 is expected to be followed by a move back toward 
8.28. When the rate moved toward the top of the band, say, 8.4 yuan/dollar, then 
authorized banks would voluntarily intervene to drive it back down.  When these 
banks know that the PBC is prepared to intervene decisively at either the upper or 
lower boundaries of the band, they will act as dealers (stabilizing speculators) to 
nudge the rate toward the middle of the band—without the PBC actually 
intervening. This ensures that the PBC need not itself intervene much in practice. 
Then, the clearing of most international payments would devolve from the People’s 
Bank of China (PBC) to the commercial banks or other authorized financial 
institutions. Subject to constraints on their net foreign exchange position, they would 
be free to make hedging markets in foreign exchange futures and options for their 
nonblank customers.  
However, if there is a crisis, as when foreigners are put heavy political pressure on 
China to appreciate leading to hot money inflows, then the PBC has little choice but 
to intervene by however much is necessary to preserve the central rate. 
Changes in the market exchange rate within such a narrow band would not 
significantly affect—or be intended to affect—a country’s competitiveness in 
international markets for goods or services. It is simply a device for providing 
flexibility in decentralizing the foreign exchange market. As discussed in Section II 
above, under a securely fixed central exchange rate, high growth in domestic money 
wages—reflecting China’s very high growth in labor productivity—would remain 
the dominant mechanism for balancing international competitiveness. 
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